

Tutorial: Assessing and Computing the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) for Turbo Machinery Protection**Curt Miller**

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ABSTRACT

The application of Safety Integrity Level (SIL) to support risk management strategy on turbo machinery protection systems is relatively new to the process industry. Few end users and manufacturers fully understand the methodology used for determining, assessing and computing the SIL of protection systems on their machines.

SIL is quickly becoming the new standard by which the industry, manufacturers and end users will be held to by regulators as good engineering practice. Specifically supporting turbomachinery, the latest API Standard 670, Machinery Protection Systems [R1] has embraced such methodology and included Appendix L, an informative section on Safety Integrity Level on its application.

This tutorial attempts to explain the Basics of SIL, how it is applied, and what end users need to know to effectively assess their machinery protection systems. It provides examples for assessing existing systems and how to compute SIL levels for new and older systems. It shows common SIL ratings for turbine driven trains, reciprocating compressors, motor and gas turbine driven equipment. This tutorial will also highlight the economic justification and cost benefit of utilizing SIL on machinery protection systems.

Not knowing or understanding SIL as it applies to machinery protection will not be an excuse in the future. This tutorial will provide a good opportunity to learn more about SIL and its application to turbo machinery protection.

BACKGROUND ON RISK MANAGEMENT AND APPLICATION OF SIL

The need for a more quantitative approach to risk mitigation dates back over 20 years. The background leading to such practices is supported in this first section which details previous incidents, process safety codes and standards, and a review of qualitative deficiencies.

Historical Incidents and Incentives for Change

Most are familiar with the large catastrophic incidents that stimulated the process safety changes. Namely, who could forget?

- Flixborough, England
- Bhopal, India
- Piper Alpha
- Philips, Pasadena

In each of these cases, risk was not recognized and catastrophic results occurred due to changes made without a full review of engineered protective systems.

But are you aware of the magnitude of rotating equipment failure for similar issues? In 2009, Mr. Edward Clark published Steam Turbine Overspeed Incidents and it combined listings from three respected consultants [R2]. Below is a table summarizing the number of serious consequences from the 110 turbine overspeed cases presented in the study.

Consequence	Period	No.	%/Period
Major \$\$ Cost	During Ops	30	27%
Fatality	During Ops	3	4%
	During Testing	3	12%
Major Incidents/ Total		36/110	33%

Table 1: Summary of Steam Turbine Overspeed Incidents

Also, Mr. Clark prepared a list titled Recent Rotating Equipment Failures at Five Refineries [R3] and it contains similar history as shown in Table 2 below.

Equipment	Site	Event
Unit Charge Pump	A	Major Fire
Pump A	A	Vapor Cloud Release
Pump B	A	Vapor Cloud Release
Unit Screw Compressor	A	Major Fire
Pump	A	Major Fire
Pump	B	Major Fire
Coker Wet Gas Compressor	C	Vapor Cloud Release
XX Crude Pump	C	Major Fire
FCC Auxiliary Air Blower	D	Fire
FCC Unit Main Air Blower	E	Near Miss

Table 2: Recent Rotating Equip Failures Five Refineries Summary

Such events support a change to a more thorough approach to risk analysis, interlock design, and operational measures so that such incidents are minimized as low as reasonably practicable.

Standards Timeline

New process plant design and existing facilities have included risk assessments associated with their unique processes for many years, although it was not until the release of 29 CFR 1910.119, Process Safety Management (PSM) for Highly Hazardous Chemicals [R4] that it became a formal requirement in the U.S. *(Note that some equivalent requirements are usually present in other parts of the world, but not always.)*

After OSHA 1910.119, there was a succession of domestic and international attempts at standards for interlock design. They included:

- AICHE CCPS, Guidelines for Safe Automation of Chemical Processes, 1993
- ISA S84.01-1996, App. of Safety Inst. Sys. for the Process Ind., Feb. 15, 1996
- ANSI approval of S84, 1997
- IEC 61508, Functional Safety: Safety-Related Systems "General" released, 1998
- OSHA recommends S84, Mar 23, 2000
- IEC 61511, Functional Safety: Safety Inst. Systems for the Process Ind., 2002
- ISA S84.00.01-2004, Sept 2, 2004 (ISA84)

The focus of this paper is on implementation of ISA84 [R5] to rotating equipment. Its full implementation involves a Safety Life Cycle (SLC) as most have experienced with engineered systems and will be highlighted in the following section.

Specific to turbomachinery, the 5th edition of the API Machinery Protection Standard API670 provides detailed guidelines on the implementation of the machinery protection systems (MPSs). It will be reviewed in more detail shortly.

Qualitative versus Quantitative Techniques for Risk Mitigation

Process Hazard Assessment (PHA) is a systematic way to identify all potential hazards for a facility so the risk team can determine how to manage each one. Generally speaking, HAZOPs are favored for their thoroughness with processes, since the whole plant is reviewed node-by-node, with a detailed set of guide words applied to each characteristic of the process. What-ifs, FMEAs, and Checklists are used for many rotating equipment configurations.

The primary objective of the PHA studies was to identify the causes of potential safety and environmental hazards, as well as major operability problems. Based on the evaluated consequences and safeguards identified, the multi-disciplined PHA team proposed recommendations to reduce the risk and enhance operability to tolerable levels in compliance with each company's risk criteria.

Use of qualitative risk ranking tools is relatively simple, but lead to inconsistencies between different PHA teams as well as the potential to under or over-estimate the risk. For lower level risks, this is not generally a significant concern, however, for higher risks there is a need for management to be able to make better informed decisions using a more consistent basis. That requires a greater level of insight and is provided by more quantitative analysis techniques that determine if there is a risk or Safety Integrity Level (SIL) gap. In layman terms, SIL refers to "orders of risk reduction" as shown in the following table:

SIL	Risk Reduction
1	> 10 factor
2	> 100 factor
3	> 1,000 factor

Table 3: SIL & Risk Reduction

After such risk targets are discovered, other Safety Life Cycle (SLC) processes are followed such as verification calculations of the formally termed Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs). This and other such processes ensure that the SIFs are capable of achieving the necessary risk reduction.

PHA Example – Reciprocating Compressor

The following table provides a glimpse of the main components for a reciprocating compressor PHA.

Deviation	Cause	Consequence	Safe-guards	S	L	R	Recommendation
Too High level	Level dump fails closed	Water entrainment leading to damage & loss of containment	High level alarm	2	4	3	1. Consider adding high level trip if required by LOPA
	Maint. valve inadvertently left closed	Water entrainment leading to damage & loss of containment	High level alarm	2	5	4	(repeat 1. Add high level trip)

Table 4: PHA Example – Reciprocating Compressor

This PHA data will serve as input to the subsequent SIL analysis to further quantify that risk reduction was obtained.

FUNDAMENTALS ON SIL REQUIREMENTS

Once an interlock has received the "SIL branding", the ISA84 standard requires that other steps be followed diligently to ensure that both random and systematic failure is not introduced into its

design and operability. The highlights of this process are captured in the remainder of this section.

Functional Safety Management (FSM)

The first ISA 84 objective is to specify safety lifecycle (SLC) management and technical activities needed to implement the safety instrumented system. It should designate responsibilities for each SLC phase and the activities within that phase.

The basic FSM tasks include:

1. Defining a safety lifecycle process.
2. Developing a functional safety management procedure.
3. Develop a project execution safety plan.

Functional safety management (FSM) is specifically noted to act as an extension to existing monitored quality systems and processes. This quality-based philosophy of “plan, execute according to plan, verify, document, and improve based on the resulting experience” carries through the entire safety lifecycle.

Alternative SIL Determination Methods

There are various graphical and numerical techniques to determine the required SIL value to achieve a target risk goal. Those cited in ISA84 follow in Table 2.

Annex	Name	Origin
A	ALARP* (As Low as Reasonably Practicable)	UK **
B	Semi-Quantitative	USA
C	Safety Layer Matrix	USA
D	Calibrated Risk Graph: Semi-Quantitative	UK + Finland
E	Risk Graph: Qualitative	Germany
F	Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)	USA

Table 5: Comparison of different SIL Selection Methods

Each of these methods should give roughly the same answer if they're "calibrated" to the same tolerable risk. The real choice in technique depends more on what fits best with a company's existing risk management philosophy and procedures. For each hazard, the SIL technique must take into account:

1. The corporations' tolerable limits
2. Full and mitigated consequences of each hazard
3. Root cause or initiating event frequency
4. Number and effectiveness of independent safeguards

If there's a gap between the tolerable and current hazard frequency (taking into account the applicable safeguards, but not the SIF), then added protection is required. It can be either a SIF or other layers of protection.

Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)

Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is one of the more popular SIL methods utilized. LOPA has been described as a semi-quantitative method of risk analysis and is a new and progressive approach to risk reduction for the process industries. The key elements that differentiate it from other qualitative SIL selection formats are:

- Quantification of the risk accounting for initiating cause frequency and independent layers of protection (IPL), where IPLs prevent the propagation and fulfillment of a hazardous event.
- Application of conditional modifiers (probabilities) that affect the likelihood of the hazardous event being enabled or mitigation and thus alters the hazardous event outcome.

The LOPA methodology helps us predict with greater certainty and consistency whether or not the risk complies with corporate criteria.

Data used in the LOPAs and their references are normally documented in each company's guidance document.

LOPA Worksheet Example

Without going into the intricate details of the LOPA process, the following worksheet (Figure 1) shows how these key elements are utilized together.

The worksheet is titled 'LOPA Scenario No. 1' and 'RAID 3-33'. It details a deviation 'High Pressure' leading to a hazard 'Overpressure and vessel rupture'. The consequence is 'TMEL (Target Mitigated Event Limit)', and the category is 'Safety'. The initiating cause is 'Initiating Cause 1' with a frequency of 0.10. The worksheet then lists independent protection layers (IPLs) A through G, each with a description and a probability. These are combined with site data (frequency modifiers, time at risk, occupancy factor, ignition probability) to calculate the LOPA result. The final result is 'Fail' with a resulting IL of 'IL1'.

Figure 1: Typical Turbomachinery LOPA Worksheet

If the LOPA study found that there was a deficiency in risk reduction, the site would need to look at either eliminating or lowering the frequency of initiating causes, adding independent protection layers, or verifying that their current or proposed safety instrument shutdown function met the level of risk reduction set by the corporate policy. The latter case is called SIL verification and is based on instrumentation make-up and testing frequency. If the calculation proved that the required risk reduction was met, no further action would be required.

Safety Requirement Specification (SRS)

The safety requirements specification (SRS) is the primary reference for the remaining parts of the safety lifecycle. This document is especially important since it often marks the handoff of safety lifecycle responsibility from one company to another and is a key project communication document. Once these requirements are clearly laid out, they will significantly help the remaining design, installation, and operation phases of the safety

systems lifecycle. The SRS addresses both functional and integrity specifications as stated below.

The functional part of the SRS describes what the safety instrumented function does when harm from a given hazard is imminent. Required details include process inputs and their trip set-points, safety system outputs and their actions, and the logical relationship between each of them. This is a similar requirement for any control loop within the basic process control system, but in the SRS case, improved safety, not production, is the goal. Some of the specified functional requirements that have been included in ISA84 are included in Table 6.

ISA84 SRS Functional Requirements
Defined safe state
SIS process measurements and their trip points
SIS process output actions
The functional relationship between inputs / outputs
Manual shutdown detail
Energize or de-energize to trip specification
Action(s) to be taken on loss of energy source(s) to SIS
Method to reset the SIS after a shutdown

Table 6: ISA84 SRS Functional Requirements

The integrity part of the SRS describes “how well” the safety instrumented function needs to work when harm from a given hazard is imminent. In this part of the SRS, it must specify such things as the required SIL, as well as necessary diagnostics, maintenance, and testing. Some of the specified integrity requirements that have been included in ISA84 are included in Table 7.

ISA84 SRS Integrity Requirements
Proof test intervals
Response time for the SIS to bring process to safe state
SIL & operational demand mode (demand or continuous)
Maximum allowable spurious trip rate
Failure modes & desired response of the SIS (alarms, auto s/d)
All interfaces between the SIS and any other system (BPCS, ops)
The extremes of all SIS environmental conditions
Requirements for diagnostics to achieve the required SIL

Table 7: ISA84 SRS Integrity Requirements

Verification Calculations

Each safety instrumented function (SIF) design must now be verified through probabilistic calculations. (See ISA84 Clause 11.9.1) The key here is to do the probabilistic calculations for each SIF which will verify safety and spurious trip performance criteria as well as optimize design to economically meet the requirements for each different function. The spurious trip discovery could be quite significant for plant production where it has been stated that up to 18% of plant trips are associated with instrumentation.

Verification calculations are performed after the other conceptual design steps have been completed at draft level. See *Safety Instrumented Systems Verification -Practical Probabilistic Calculations* [R6] for more information on this subject.

If calculations show that the draft design does not meet the SIL target, the choices are:

1. Shorten the testing interval, but not beyond the practical point for operations
2. Select better technology/equipment.
3. Add redundancy or other IPLs

The conceptual design iterations will continue until the SIL or risk reduction target is met with the overall most economical system.

SIL Verification Calculations Example

Although the SIL verification calculations can be completed by hand with the ISA84 simplified equations and Markov models, most functional safety professionals prefer to use off-the-shelf tools. Shown below is the output of such software.




Figure 3: SIL Verification Analysis Output

Maintenance and Testing

Since OSHA 1910.119 Process Safety Management covered many of the operations and maintenance requirements, most companies are performing some level of tests. For many, it is a full functional test from the sensor to the final device done a periodic basis that aligns with their scheduled shutdowns.

While this is still considered good practice, there may be benefits employed by utilizing upgraded diagnostic methods that are less invasive on the process. Given the capabilities of safety certified instrumentation, many of the functional proof test methods

developed for relays and pneumatic instruments is not only less effective, but very costly compared to more appropriate methods.

The biggest issue with proof testing is that no methods have 100% coverage of dangerous failures. To account for this discrepancy, replacement or “rebuild to new” (i.e. mission times) now must be specified for all equipment and they must be within the useful life of the component.

The second issue discovered when reviewing site test practices is that most procedures included the full functional test, but testing of the diagnostic routines was not completed. Since the associated SIFs verification included such diagnostics, such test practices had to be upgraded to account for detection of faults, degraded architecture, and presentation of associated alarms.

Example – Optimized Turbine Testing and Maintenance

As discussed in above, no proof tests are 100% effective in detecting all covert faults. Due to such a limitation, turbomachinery specialists in one corporation inherently understood this issue and have been rebuilding their critical trip and throttle valves in every turnaround for years. This level of maintenance, coupled with optimized partial stroke testing techniques, has helped each site meet their SIL2 safety and production goals simultaneously.

SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS OF SIL WITHIN API670

Although API Machinery Protection Standard API670 has been around since the 1980s, the November 2014 update adds over 150 pages of new content. The most notable changes are shown in the following table:

Clause /Annex	Specification
8	Electronic Overspeed -More detailed discussion
9	Surge detection (New)
10	ESD (New)
K	Surge Detection (New)
L	Safety Integrity Level (New)
M	Spurious Shutdowns (New)
N	Condition Monitoring (New)
O	Overspeed (New)
P	Recip Compressors (New)
Q	Wireless (New)

Table 8: New Clauses & Annexes in API670

Such additions support a cohesive strategy with the other process and machine functional safety standards.

Emergency Shutdown Device (ESD) and API670

The Emergency Shutdown Device (ESD) detailed in clause 10 is synonymous to the SIS detailed by ISA84. By having such a “single brain” for supporting all the critical safety functions, the first requirement of consolidating all trip demands and ensuring “proper timing and sequencing for a safe shutdown” is met.

There is latitude on whether all the shutdown logic is performed in the ESD. If it is not and separate surge, monitoring, and overspeed systems are tied into the ESD, the overall system is considered to have “distributed architecture”. If such functions are included in the ESD, then it is termed “Integrated Architecture”.

Annex L – Safety Integrity Level

Annex L provides a 17-page introduction of the SIL concepts and correlates their application to turbomachinery standards. Although the risk graph methodology is not as prevalent in the USA as it is in Europe, its principals still apply to those that have standardized on LOPA as mentioned earlier.

Key takeaways from this SIL annex include:

- SIL compliance, although associated directly to the ESD logic solver, should be extended to the I/O devices
- Separation of control and safety is imperative
- SIL is determined by performance requirements set by each user, not by prescriptive methods

Such practices line up closely with those of the currently functional standards like ISA84.

Annex M – Spurious Shutdowns

Since safe, fault tolerant methods with higher spurious trip rates may at times oppose process uptime (i.e. machine reliability), this annex “recommends some practice to reduce the risk of economic losses”.

Key takeaways from this spurious trip annex include:

- Utilization of fault tolerant designs for safety and reliability
- Applying preventative diagnostics where applicable

Regarding plant impact examples, the following table truly supports such measures.

Process Application	Spurious Trip Cost
Oil & Gas Platforms	Up to \$2 million/day
Polystyrene	20 days to recover at \$20k/day=\$400k
Refinery Coker Heater	\$35k/day
Refinery Catalytic Cracker	\$500k
Complete Refinery	\$1 million/day
Ammonia & Urea Plants	\$1 million/day
Power Generation	\$100k/MW hour to \$millions/site
Ethylene	\$1 million to include getting product to spec

Table 9: Spurious Trip Cost in Different Process Industries [R7]

COMMON SIL RATINGS FOR ROTATING EQUIPMENT

As shown in the preceding section, the process of SIL assignment takes into account the end user's risk target, consequence severity, initiating cause frequency, the number of safeguards, and the application of conditional modifiers, so the final SIL requirement can vary widely. Utilizing the experience of the authors and a broad perspective of reviews, the following table offers a glimpse of what could be expected.

Driver	Application	SIL Target		
		High	Low	Norm
Steam turbine	Overspeed	SIL2	SIL1	SIL1
Centrifugal Compressor	Anti-Surge	SIL2	None	SIL1
	High Level	SIL2	None	SIL1
Gas turbine	Light Off	SIL2	SIL1	SIL1
Turbine Generator	Overspeed	SIL2	SIL2	SIL2
Reciprocating Compressor	High Level	SIL2	None	SIL1
	HP discharge	SIL2	None	SIL1

Table 10: Common SIL Targets for Rotating Equipment

Naturally, each company must review each application individually to avoid either over- specification, or more imperative for safety, under-specification of turbomachinery SIL.

ECONOMIC JUSTIFICATION OF SIL

Based on the previous publication on turbomachinery failures at refineries [R3] and a general review of their applications, the following table summarizes where the SIL principles could be applied.

Equipment	Event	SIL Case?	Issue
Charge Pump	Major Fire	Yes	Failure of lube oil trip
Pump A	Vapor Cloud	Yes	Seal pressure trip
Pump B	Vapor Cloud Release	Yes	Seal pressure interlock
Unit Screw Comp	Major Fire	Yes	Failure of lube oil trip
Pump	Major Fire	Mech	Vibration?
Pump	Major Fire	Yes	Vibration trip
Coker Wet Gas Comp	Vapor Cloud Release	Yes	Vibration trip
Crude Pump	Major Fire	Mech issue	Vibration?
FCC Aux Air Blower	Fire	Yes	Surge detection
FCC Main Air Blower	Near Miss	Yes	Integrity issue of interlock

Table 11: Recent Rotating Equip Failures Five Refineries Summary of SIL Issues

Of those, the majority may have been prevented following better SIL functional safety management.

In addition to the incidents listed above, the same could be said for the 110 steam turbine overspeed incidents [R2]. The following table summarizes primary failure modes for the interlocks in those cases.

Interlock Failure Classification		Cases	%
Random Hardware Failure		22	20.0%
Systematic Failure	Analysis	9	8.2%
	Design	15	13.6%
	Commissioning	2	1.8%
	Operational	10	9.1%
	Testing	25	22.7%
Failure cause not stated		27	24.5%
Cases total		110	100%

Table 12: Summary of Steam Turbine Overspeed Failures

As can be shown, systematic failures account for over 50% of the overspeed cases. More detailed procedures, verification, and 3rd party assessments should minimize such accidents.

SIL Economics – Justification for Investment

The 36 serious accidents that resulted from turbine overspeed errors can be broken down into two general categories, namely:

- Functional Specification**

These are the actions needed to prevent the incident that are laid out by the safety controls engineer in the form of detailed requirements, such as input & outputs and their relationships, response time, trip points, etc. In an HSE study [R8], two examples (reactor and material handling) presented had incorrect safe state action after the hazard was detected.

- Integrity Specification**

This involves the "failure free" operation of the safety system. The failures could be either random (component failures) or systematic (based on procedures. Two random failure examples include circuit board and motor contactor failures.

As an economics example based on a functional specification error, consider the following catastrophic event scenario. You have the potential for a large loss of \$10 Million based upon an initiating event that could occur every ten years. If your corporate tolerable frequency limit for an event of this magnitude is once in ten thousand years, then you are accepting the following risk targets:

- Tolerable Cost/yr = \$10 million/10,000 years = \$1,000/yr
- Chance of Plant Accident in 50 years= 50 yr * (accident/10,000 years) * 100= 0.5%

To lower the frequency to this tolerable level, a combination of safeguards will need to be in place which prevent the initiating event from causing the accident at least 999 out of 1,000 times. Naturally, the more independent non-SIS safeguards that you have in place, the lower the safety system's SIL rating needs to be. This is shown below in the two left hand columns. The table also shows the escalating cost associated with making a specification error such that the SIS does not prevent the accident even when it works according to design.

Non - SIS IPLs*	SIS Rating	With Loss of SIS		Increase in Cost Over Tolerable
		Cost	Chance of Accident in Lifetime	
2	SIL1	\$10,000/yr	5%	\$9,000/yr
1	SIL2	\$100,000/yr	50%	\$99,000/yr
0	SIL3	\$1,000,000/yr	Near 100%	\$999,000/yr

* Non-SIS IPLs (i.e. Basic Process Control System, operator intervention, pressure relief valves, and deluge systems) are typical non-SIS safeguards for many companies. Each safeguard is assumed to have a Risk Reduction Factor (RRF) of 10.

Table 13: Exposure with Loss of SIS Protection

As the table dramatically shows, it is increasingly important to get the functional specification correct when working with higher SIL values. This is why the ISA 84-2004 safety lifecycle design stages and the methods to reduce systematic errors are based upon each safety function's SIL value. The higher the SIL, the more strenuous your safety lifecycle reviews and cross checks must be to ensure that systematic errors are kept in check.

As we noted, the safety lifecycle deals with both random and systematic causes of accidents. The random part is addressed and managed with the part of SIL related to probability of failure upon demand averaged (PFD_{avg}) and risk reduction factor. But since it represents only part of the safety system specification and only part of the sources for dangerous errors, more is needed. Other systematic problems, such as failing to consider alternate paths to the accident or not fully specifying all of the elements of the safety function can kill people just as dead. Thus, the functional safety management parts of the safety lifecycle that address these systematic errors are vitally needed to provide the required risk reduction.

EXAMPLE: THE COMPLETE SIL PROCESS APPLIED TO A HIGH HORSEPOWER TURBINE

These unique SIL processes were recently utilized on a critical high horsepower turbine application and will be generally discussed so that the overall safety lifecycle can be understood.

1. Utilizing a HAZOP to Identify a High Severity Hazard

Per OSHA 1910.119 regulatory requirements for review of process hazards every 5 years, a HAZOP was conducted and the team concluded that a loss of load based on a coupling failure would result in turbine overspeed. Such an event was considered significant and had severe personnel injury and mechanical impacts

2. Applying a LOPA Review to Quantify Risk

Since the user wanted to follow Recognized and Generally Accepted Good Engineering Practice (RAGAGEP) for risk mitigation, LOPA practices were adapted to further quantify risk exposure. The turbine overspeed scenario met the criteria for further detailed analysis through LOPA due to its severe safety consequences.

Based on the cause, consequence severities, and safe guards stated in the HAZOP, the following LOPA worksheet was completed by a competent team during a LOPA workshop.

LOPA Worksheet														
LOPA Scenario No.: 1														
PHA:	HAZOP	Date	5/21/13	Description	Turbine Loss of Load	P&ID	120-D-18							
Deviation	Turbine Overspeed		Hazard		Potential high speed failure of casing and rotor ejection into turbine building. Potential equipment damage, loss of containment if compressor struck, and personnel injury if present									
TMEL (Target Mitigated Event Likelihood)														
Consequence	Category	Description								TMEL (yr)				
Safety	B	Severe Injury								1.0E-04				
Environmental		(none identified)								1.0E+00				
Commercial	B	Significant business interruption								1.0E-03				
Initiating Causes (IC)														
IC #	Description	Frequency / yr	Applicable IPLs from List below							ICL * PFD	Frag Mod Set			ICL * PFDs * FMs
1	Coupling failure on CGC	0.01	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	1.0E-02	1	#2	#3	1.0E-02
2										0.0E+00				0.0E+00
3										0.0E+00				0.0E+00
Summation (a) For Environmental & Commercial										1.0E-02	(b) For Safety		1.0E-02	
Independent Protection Layers (IPLs) may be common to more than one initiating event														
IPL Letter	Category	Description of IPL								PFD				
A	BPCS									1				
B	Ops Response	(no current alarms/operator response that is effective)								1				
C	PSV1									1				
E	Other1									1				
Frequency Modifiers (FMs) - Applied Only to Safety														
Type	Set #1	Set #2	Set #3											
Time at Risk (Ptr)	1	1	1											
Occupancy Factor (Pp)	1.0000	1.0000	1											
Ignition Probability (Pi)	1	1	1											
LOPA Ratio (or PFD _{SP} if < 1.0)														
Category	Value	LOPA Result								Resulting IL				
Safety	0.010	Fail								SIL2				
Environmental	100.00	Pass								Not Required				
Commercial	0.10	Fail								SIL1				
Recommendation(s)														
	Description								Target IL					
Existing SIF	XSHH-103 high speed trip set at 8000 rpm								IL2					
Potential SIF														
General Requirements LOPA analysis supports upgrade of Overspeed Trip to IL2.														
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Figure 3: LOPA Tool Output for High HP Turbine

After reviewing the current safeguards and determining that none besides the overspeed trip were effective to prevent the hazard, the LOPA output specified a SIL2 requirement for the trip system.

3. Defining SIL Requirements in the SRS

Since the overspeed interlock was now SIL2 classified, documentation was developed to specify its performance requirements. In all, there were twenty-seven requirements documented to meet the ISA84 functional safety standard.

The most stringent SRS requirement was the process safety time of only 50 milli-seconds due to such a quick load release on a turbine of such horsepower. Like all the SRS requirements, such an accelerated response would need to be validated during the pre-startup safety review and all proof tests in the future.

4. Performing SIL Verification to Prove that SIL2 was Attained

To prove that the overspeed trip met the SIL2 risk target, reliability calculations were performed as the next step in the functional safety lifecycle. Such calculations were based on the components selected, their voting architecture, diagnostics applied, and finally, testing and replacement intervals.

The specific components that made up the overspeed trip system included the magnetic pickup sensors, logic solver (i.e. Safety PLC or SIS), the trip & throttle shutoff valve, and any interface components in between. There initially was no concern in meeting the SIL2 target since the overspeed system applied SIL3 certified electronics and the final element was partial stroke tested.

Data for the certified devices was readily available in the vendor's product safety manuals. It should be noted that the two (2) commonly accepted functional safety assessment agencies include

TUV and exida Certification and the standard adhered to is IEC61508 [R9].

Since the trip & throttle valve had not been certified and the manufacturer had no failure mode specific data, the SIS project engineer contracted a Failure Modes, Effects, and Diagnostics Analysis (FMEDA). This analysis was specific to the OEM’s valve assembly and therefore resulted in a precise, yet conservative data set to be used in the SIL verification calculations.. Otherwise, conservative data based on generic components would have been used and the SIL2 risk target likely would not have been met.

Another SIL2 issue surfaced when an emergency trip device (ETD) was discovered in the turbine mechanical drawings. The ETD was critical to the overspeed trip since it acted as an interface component for dumping the hydraulic power fluid. Since it could not be tested by the partial stroke apparatus, it became a SIL2 limiter and the overspeed system became degraded to SIL1. Fortunately, the design team found an alternative solution to avoid adding an inline steam valve (~ \$300k).

The team utilized a commercially available software platform to perform the calculations. SIL2 results were achieved by using partial stroke testing and accounting for specific overspeed failure modes where a significant leak was required to fit the scenario stated. The results are shown in Figure 4.




Figure 4: SIL Verification Tool Output for High HP Turbine

With the upgraded model, this overspeed trip met SIL2 and had a 7.15 year spurious trip rate.

5. Periodic Maintenance & Testing

Once operational, periodic procedures were to be developed and performed as per the SIL verification and manufacturers requirements. Any component failures will be documented and also compared to data utilized in the original study to ensure that the risk target is continually achieved.

By applying and documenting each of these ISA84 safety lifecycle steps, the user felt assured that they had met current RAGAGEP and underwriter requirements.

CONCLUSION

SIL is here to stay; get on-board

Taken individually, each of the guidance measures presented in the earlier chapters should make “good engineering sense”. But dependent upon where each company is in their functional safety lifecycle development, the sum of the measures may be overwhelming. The key takeaway is this – each progressive step forward makes our industry a safer one.

Applied properly, SIL knowledge will be an advantage

Although the task of ISA84 compliance can seem daunting, it is worth the effort. With a growing public risk aversion, the process industry cannot be satisfied with an “it’s never happened here before” safety culture.

Each progressive measure taken in ISA84 compliance is fully worth the investment. Although most responsible facilities want to get there immediately, a 6 to 10 year full implementation is expected. The key takeaway is this – each step forward makes our industry a safer one.

ABBREVIATIONS

- API – American Petroleum Institute
- ESD – Emergency Shutdown Device
- ISA – International Systems and Automation
- FSM – Functional Safety Management
- LOPA – Layer of Protection Analysis
- SLC – Safety Lifecycle
- SIF – Safety Instrumented Function
- SIL – Safety Integrity Level
- SRS – Safety Requirements Specification

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